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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2012, Gavin was born prematurely.1 As a result, he experienced low 
muscle tone and didn’t reach his early standard benchmarks typical of a child his 
age.2 Gavin’s health and development only seemed to worsen by the time he 
turned two.3 It took almost two years before Gavin could walk, and almost three 
before he could talk.4 Ultimately, Gavin was diagnosed “with complex partial 
seizures, cerebral palsy and an unknown genetic anomaly, as well as cyclical 
vomiting and autism.”5 
Gavin’s doctors prescribed him “the anticonvulsant Keppra for his seizures.”6 
The three-year-old experienced immediate relief from the seizures, but his 
autistic behavior worsened, leading to uncontrollable meltdowns.7 While Gavin’s 
parents read about this so-called “Keppra rage,” they “were hesitant to take him 
off of the drug or add another one” because it was successfully reducing his 
seizures.8 During this time, Gavin’s mother saw a documentary on CNN about 
the potential health benefits some experienced using marijuana.9 
By 2014, “his behavior [was] out of control, [and] life with Gavin had 
become a daily struggle.”10 That was when Gavin’s mother brought him to see 
Dr. Bonni Goldstein, “a physician who specializes in cannabis medicine in Los 
Angeles, California.”11 Within ten days of starting a new treatment involving 
marijuana, Gavin, “[who was] previously non-verbal, began speaking.”12 He was 
weaned off of Keppra over the next five months, and after [his] dosage was 
adjusted, “Gavin hasn’t needed any further antiepileptic medications.”13 
Although not everyone will experience such drastic levels of improvement, 
 
 * J.D. Candidate, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, to be conferred 2019. I would like 
to thank the editorial staff of The University of the Pacific Law Review for their mentorship and guidance. I 
would also like to thank my mom Terri and my grandma Maddy for their unconditional love and support.   
1. Bonni Goldstein, Five-Year-Old Gavin’s Cannabis Success Story Will Move You to Tears, MARIJUANA 
(Apr. 20, 2017, 8:20 AM), https://www.marijuana.com/news/2017/04/five-year-old-gavins-cannabis-success-
story-will-move-you-to-tears/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
2. Id. 
3. Id. 
4. Id. 
5. Id.  
6. Id. 
7. Id. 
8. Id. 
9. Id. 
10. Id. 
11. Id. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. 
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“Gavin’s story is an example of why cannabis treatment must be an available 
option for all . . . with severe medical conditions.”14 
Californians voted to allow the medical and recreational use of marijuana in 
1996 and 2016, respectively.15 Under the Obama administration, Californians in 
compliance with the law were given assurances that they “would not be subject 
to harassment, arrest, or incarceration by the federal government” so long as their 
state developed “a robust regulatory and enforcement system.”16 With the 
election of Donald Trump as President, it is unclear how his administration will 
handle federal enforcement of marijuana laws.17 While President Trump voiced 
support for states’ rights on the issue of legal marijuana, his nomination of Jeff 
Sessions, a staunch anti-drug crusader,18 indicated a potential shift towards a 
federal crackdown.19 
Since Californians have voted to approve the medical and recreational use of 
marijuana, the use of state and local authorities for a federal crackdown would be 
contrary to majoritarian sentiment.20 To prevent this from occurring, Assembly 
Member Jones-Sawyer introduced AB 1578.21 AB 1578 would have prohibited 
state or local agencies from using resources to assist federal authorities in 
enforcement of marijuana laws, unless directed by court order.22 
Part II provides an overview of the historical context and background issues 
preceding AB 1578.23 Part III lays out AB 1578’s essential provisions.24 Finally, 
Part IV discusses some of the legal issues relevant to AB 1578.25 
 
14. Id. 
15. Michael Boldin, California Assembly Passes Bill to Ban Resources for Federal Marijuana 
Enforcement, TENTH AMENDMENT CTR. (June 1, 2017), http://blog.tenthamendmentcenter.com/2017/06/ 
california-assembly-passes-bill-to-ban-resources-for-federal-marijuana-enforcement/ (on file with The 
University of the Pacific Law Review). 
16. Ryan Morimune, AB 1578: Protecting Californians Against Federal Attacks on Lawful Marijuana 
Activity, LARRP, available at http://www.lareentry.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/AB-1578-Fact-Sheet.pdf 
(on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
17. Keegan Hamilton, A Trump Crackdown on Legal Weed Could Cost the U.S. a Quarter Million Jobs, 
VICE NEWS (Feb. 27, 2017), https://news.vice.com/story/a-trump-crackdown-on-legal-weed-could-cost-the-u-s-
a-quarter-million-jobs (last visited Oct. 4, 2017) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
18. Christopher Teague, Jeff Sessions: Anti-Weed Crusader Received Big Money From Big Tobacco, 
HERB (July 3, 2017), http://herb.co/2017/07/03/jeff-sessions-big-tobacco/ (on file with The University of the 
Pacific Law Review). 
19. Carrie Johnson, Legal Marijuana Advocates Are Uneasy With Sessions’ Stance, NPR (Apr 6, 2017, 
5:08 AM), http://www.npr.org/2017/04/06/522821701/legal-marijuana-advocates-are-uneasy-with-sessions-
stance (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (noting how Sessions’ nomination raised fears of 
a federal crackdown on marijuana).  
20. See Morimune, supra note 16 (noting that California’s voters and legislature approved of marijuana). 
21. Id. 
22. Id. 
23. Infra Part II. 
24. Infra Part III. 
25. Infra Part IV.  
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Although marijuana is classified as a Schedule I substance under the 
Controlled Substances Act26 and remains illegal under federal law, Californians 
legalized the medical use of marijuana by passing the Compassionate Use Act of 
1996.27 Following California’s lead, 12 states approved measures permitting the 
medical use of marijuana.28 Under President Clinton and President Bush, the 
United States Department of Justice (DOJ) largely gave “a free pass” to medical 
marijuana users who complied with state law.29 
President Obama’s administration continued this laissez-faire policy by 
promulgating the Rohrabacher-Farr Amendment,30 which prevents the DOJ from 
aggressively targeting states that allow for the use of medical marijuana.31 While 
President Trump has yet to alter federal marijuana policies, his nomination of 
Jeff Sessions for Attorney General signals a potential change in policy and 
concerns persons operating in compliance with California law.32 
The Obama-era policies created a platform that allowed voters to decide the 
fate of marijuana laws in their states.33 This potential shift in federal policy—
away from the voters’ preference—provides context for and insight into what 
prompted AB 1578.34 Part A explains how California enforced marijuana laws 
prior to AB 1578.35 Part B analyzes the federal guidelines for enforcing 
 
26. Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 812, Schedule I(c)(10) (2017). 
27. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (1996) (Cal. Proposition 215). 
28. David G. Savage, Supreme Court Action Upholds California’s Medical Pot Law, L.A. TIMES (May 
19, 2009, 11:03 AM), http://articles.latimes.com/2009/may/19/nation/na-court-marijuana19 (on file with The 
University of the Pacific Law Review). 
29. STUART TAYLOR, JR., GOVERNANCE STUDIES AT BROOKINGS, MARIJUANA POLICY AND 
PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP: HOW TO AVOID A FEDERAL-STATE TRAIN WRECK  1, 20 (Apr. 2013), available at 
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Marijuana-Policy-and-Presidential-
Leadership_v27.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
30. Sara Brittany Somerset, Federal Medical Marijuana Protections Extended Through September 2017, 
HIGH TIMES (May 1, 2017), http://hightimes.com/news/federal-medical-marijuana-protections-extended-
through-september-2017/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
31. Christopher Ingraham, It Took Jeff Sessions Just One Month to Turn Obama-Era Drug Policy on Its 
Head, WASH. POST (June 2, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/06/02/it-took-jeff-
sessions-just-one-month-to-turn-obama-era-drug-policy-on-its-head/ (on file with The University of the Pacific 
Law Review). 
32. Patrick McGreevy, Weed’s Legal in California, But Activists Fear a Battle Ahead with Jeff Sessions - 
Trump’s Pick for Attorney General, L.A. TIMES (Dec 1, 2016, 12:05 AM), http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-
pol-ca-marijuana-legalization-jeff-sessions-snap-20161201-story.html (on file with The University of the 
Pacific Law Review). 
33. See Morimune, supra note 16 (explaining how the Obama administration left states that had 
developed “robust regulatory and enforcement systems” for marijuana alone).  
34. See id. (explaining how AB 1578 is intended to prevent the will of California’s voter from being 
undermined). 
35. Infra Part II.A. 
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marijuana laws.36 Part C explains the economic context of AB 1578.37 Part D 
discusses the constitutionality of anti-cooperation policies that function similar to 
AB 1578.38 Section E explains the impetus for AB 1578.39 
A. California’s Law Prior to AB 1578 
Existing law allows for the medical use of marijuana in California.40 In 1991, 
the Federal government closed the Compassionate Use Investigational New Drug 
program for marijuana, which provided medical marijuana to patients suffering 
from AIDS.41 Californians responded by approving Proposition 215,42 which 
allows a patient, or their primary caregiver, to possess or cultivate marijuana for 
medical purposes as long as they have a physician’s approval or 
recommendation.43 Proposition 215 also protects physicians from punishment for 
recommending marijuana to a patient for medical purposes, and defines “primary 
caregiver” as “the individual designated by the person exempted under this 
section who has consistently assumed responsibility for the housing, health, or 
safety of that person.”44 
Similarly, existing law permits recreational use of marijuana in California.45 
In 2016, Californians voted for, and overwhelmingly approved Proposition 
6446—also known as the Adult Use of Marijuana Act (AUMA).47 AUMA 
expands California’s marijuana law and allows adults over the age of 21 to use 
marijuana recreationally.48 AUMA allows adults over the age of 21 to “possess, 
process, transport, purchase, obtain,” and give away twenty-eight and one-half 
grams of marijuana “not in the form of concentrated cannabis.”49 On the other 
hand, AUMA limits the above-enumerated interactions with concentrated 
 
36. Infra Part II.B. 
37. Infra Part II.C. 
38. Infra Part II.D. 
39. Infra Part II.E. 
40. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (1996) (Cal. Proposition 215). 
41. CLINTON A. WERNER, MEDICAL MARIJUANA AND THE AIDS CRISIS 17 (2001). 
42. Id.  
43. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (1996) (Cal. Proposition 215). 
44. Id. 
45. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §11362.1(a)(1) (enacted by Cal. Proposition 64, approved Nov. 8, 
2016, eff. Nov. 9, 2016). 
46. California Voters Overwhelmingly Approve Marijuana Legalization, DRUG POL’Y ALLIANCE (Nov. 8, 
2016), http://www.drugpolicy.org/news/2016/11/california-voters-overwhelmingly-approve-marijuana-
legalization (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review);  Veronica Rocha, Pot smokers celebrate 
4/20 across California, L.A. TIMES (April 20, 2017 11:30 AM), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-
marijuana-420-day-california-20170420-story.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).  
47. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §11362.1(a)(1) (2016).  
48. Id. 
49. Id. 
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cannabis to only eight grams.50 Additionally, adults over the age of 21 are 
allowed “to possess, plant, cultivate, harvest, dry, or process [up to] six living 
marijuana plants,” and may possess the dried marijuana produced by the plants.51 
Even though statistics about the effects of marijuana have not been recorded 
in California since it approved Proposition 215,52 one statistic that can be 
deduced is the decrease in death by opioids year to year.53 Even without state 
records, researchers can infer the decrease in deaths by conducting a time-series 
analysis of medical cannabis laws and state-level death certificate data in all 50 
states from 1999 to 2010.54 According to a 2014 Journal of the American 
Medical Association study, “states with medical marijuana laws between 1999 
and 2010 saw, on average, about 25% fewer opiate overdose deaths than states 
without such laws.”55 Further, “the effect of a medical marijuana law appeared to 
grow over time — more lives were saved each additional year after the laws’ 
implementation, suggesting an effect from more people taking advantage of the 
programs.”56 
Numerous studies analyzing the connection between legalizing marijuana 
and the rate of death from driving under the influence (DUI) have been 
performed over the past decade; however, the findings are not all in agreement.57 
First, a 2014 American Automobile Association (AAA) Foundation for Traffic 
 
50. Id.  
51. Id. 
52. See Brooke Edwards Staggs, Considering a Career Path in the Pot Industry? Here’s What You 
Should Know, ORANGE COUNTY REG. (June 14, 2016, 6:19 AM PST), http://www.ocregister.com/2016/ 
06/14/considering-a-career-path-in-the-pot-industry-heres-what-you-should-know/ (on file with The University 
of the Pacific Law Review) (explaining that there are no reliable records related to marijuana in California 
because California has not kept records since passing Prop. 215). 
53. Christopher Ingraham, Attorney General Sessions Wants to Know the Science on Marijuana and 
Opioids. Here It Is, WASH. POST (Feb. 28, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/ 
2017/02/28/attorney-general-sessions-wants-to-know-the-science-on-marijuana-and-opioids-here-it-is/ (on file 
with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
54. Marcus A. Bachhuber et al., Medical Cannabis Laws and Opioid Analgesic Overdose Mortality in the 
United States, 1999-2010, 174 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1668 (2014). 
55. Ingraham, supra note 53.  
56. Id. 
57. Compare After States Legalized Medical Marijuana, Traffic Deaths Fell, REUTERS (Dec. 29, 2016), 
http://www.foxnews.com/health/2016/12/29/after-states-legalized-medical-marijuana-traffic-deaths-fell.html 
[hereinafter Columbia Study] (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (explaining that deaths 
fall after states legalize marijuana), with Patrick McGreevy, A Proposition to Legalize Pot Raises DUI 
Concerns: ‘We Are Going to Start Losing Folks in Astronomical Numbers’, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 18, 2016, 12:05 
AM), http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-ca-pot-proposition-64-law-enforcement-20161018-snap-story. 
html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (explaining that states that legalized marijuana saw 
increased “marijuana-related” deaths), and Tamara Johnson, Fatal Road Crashes Involving Marijuana Double 
After State Legalizes Drug, AAA NEWS ROOM, http://newsroom.aaa.com/2016/05/fatal-road-crashes-involving-
marijuana-double-state-legalizes-drug/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2017) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law 
Review) (explaining that since Washington legalized marijuana, there was a significant increase in “fatal crashes 
involving marijuana”).  
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Safety study found, “[t]he percentage . . . of drivers involved in fatal crashes who 
recently used marijuana more than doubled from 8–17% between 2013 and 
2014.”58 Second, a 2016 Rocky Mountain High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area 
(RMHIDTA) study found, “marijuana related traffic deaths in Colorado 
increased 48% since 2013, when that state legalized recreational use of 
marijuana.”59 Third, a 2016 Columbia University Mailman School of Public 
Health study analyzed 1.2 million traffic fatalities nationwide from 1985 through 
2014 and found “deaths dropped 11 percent on average in states that legalized 
medical marijuana.”60 
Studies performed on the connection between legalizing marijuana and 
violent crime rates generally come to the same conclusion—legalizing marijuana 
does not lead to an increase in violent crime.61 First, “a 2016 CATO Institute 
study determined crime rates are unaffected by marijuana legalization.”62 Second, 
a 2015 study performed by the Drug Policy Alliance found that since Washington 
legalized marijuana, “violent crime rates dropped by 10 percent.”63 Third, a 2014 
study performed by the University of Texas at Dallas found that “legalization of 
medical cannabis is not an indicator of increased crime.”64 Rather, “[i]t actually 
may be related to reductions in certain types of crime.”65 
The California legislature added California Government Code section 7282.5 
in 2014.66 It allows a law enforcement official to detain an individual on the basis 
of a United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement hold after that 
individual becomes eligible for release, if one of the specified conditions apply.67 
The specified conditions include situations where an “individual has been 
convicted . . . at any time of . . . [a]n offense involving the felony possession, 
 
58. Johnson, supra note 57.  
59. McGreevy, supra note 57.  
60. Columbia Study, supra note 57.  
61. See Alan Pyke, Sessions: Legal Pot Drives Violent Crime, Statistics be Damned, THINK PROGRESS 
(Feb. 28, 2017), https://thinkprogress.org/sessions-legal-pot-violent-crime-8640413ca090 (on file with The 
University of the Pacific Law Review) (explaining that violent crime rates tend to decrease where marijuana is 
legalized); see also No Correlation Between Medical Marijuana Legalization, Crime Increase: Legalization 
May Reduce Homicide, Assault Rates, SCIENCEDAILY (Mar. 26, 2014), www.sciencedaily.com/ 
releases/2014/03/140326182049.htm (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (explaining that 
legalizing marijuana leads to a reduction in violent crime rates). 
62. See Angela Dills et al., Dose of Reality: The Effect of State Marijuana Legalizations, CATO INST. 
(Sept. 16, 2016), https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/dose-reality-effect-state-marijuana-
legalizations#full (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (explaining that their studies are not 
conclusive either way, it appears that legalizing marijuana has no noticeable effect on crime rates). 
63. Pyke, supra note 61.  
64. No Correlation Between Medical Marijuana Legalization, Crime Increase, supra note 61. 
65. Id. 
66. CAL. GOV. CODE § 7282.5 (2014). 
67. Id. 
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sale, distribution, manufacture, or trafficking of controlled substances.”68 
Accordingly, an individual could be held after they became eligible for release if 
they were “convicted of an offense involving the felony possession, sale, 
distribution, manufacture, or trafficking of” marijuana.69 
Under California’s existing law, the Medical and Adult-Use Cannabis 
Regulation and Safety Act (MAUCRSA) regulates California’s marijuana 
industry.70 MAUCRSA integrates “the state’s medical-only regulations passed by 
the legislature (MCRSA) with the adult-use rules approved by the voters under 
[AUMA].”71 MAUCRSA underwent substantial amendments “based on the 
language passed in the budget to reconcile the MCRSA [the previous regulatory 
act for medical marijuana] and [AUMA].”72 MAUCRSA tends to follow the 
more lenient “industry-friendly rules of [AUMA].”73 
One of the most substantial changes allows “applicants to get licenses in 
different phases of the industry rather than restrict so-called vertical integration 
by allowing just a single kind of license.”74 Other significant changes made by 
MAURSA include, “[eliminating] MCRSA’s independent distributor 
requirement, [authorizing] the issuance of temporary special-event licenses, and 
[dropping] the California residency requirement for license applicants.”75 
B. Federal Guidelines for Handling Marijuana Law 
Congress passed the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) to prohibit “the 
manufacture, importation, possession, use and distribution of certain narcotics, 
stimulants, depressants, hallucinogens, anabolic steroids and other chemicals.”76 
Marijuana was listed as Schedule I, implying that it has a “high potential for 
abuse . . . no currently accepted medical use in treatment in the U.S . . . [and] a 
lack of accepted safety for use of the drug under medical supervision.”77 The 
 
68. Id. 
69. Id.  
70. Cal NORML: A Summary of the Medical Cannabis Regulation Act (MCRSA), CAL. NORML (July 
2017), http://www.canorml.org/news/A_SUMMARY_OF_THE_MEDICAL_MARIJUANA_REGULATION 
_AND_SAFETY_ACT [hereinafter NORML] (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
71. Id.  
72. An-Chi Tsou, California’s Cannabis Laws: The Next Hurdle, MANZURI L. (July 19, 2017), 
http://www.manzurilaw.com/sb94 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
73. Cal NORML, supra note 70. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. 
76. CSA Schedules, DRUGS.COM (May 4, 2014), https://www.drugs.com/csa-schedule.html (on file with 
The University of the Pacific Law Review).  
77. Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 812 (2017). 
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CSA remains in effect; however, some states have passed laws allowing for the 
medical use of marijuana and a few have legalized its recreational use.78 
In 2009, under President Obama’s administration, Deputy Attorney General 
David W. Ogden issued a memorandum to clarify the guidelines that federal 
prosecutors in states that had enacted laws authorizing the medical use of 
marijuana were to follow.79 The memo stated that medical marijuana users, and 
those who provide medical users with marijuana, would not face Federal 
prosecution as long as they complied with State law.80 
In 2011, Deputy Attorney James Cole issued a memo to further clarify the 
guidelines for Federal prosecutors, including those laid out in the Ogden memo.81 
The 2011 Cole Memo stated that individuals using medical marijuana in 
compliance with state law would still not be targeted, but individuals involved in 
cultivating, selling, or distributing marijuana for any purpose, as well as those 
who knowingly facilitate these activities may face federal prosecution.82 This 
change in policy was a sharp turn from how law enforcement interpreted the 
Federal guidelines prior to the 2011 Cole Memo.83 Accordingly, the public 
started to become wary of future Federal crackdowns on medical marijuana.84 
In 2013, James Cole, an Obama Administration Deputy Attorney issued 
further guidance with respect to the federal government’s position on marijuana 
enforcement in states that had legalized marijuana in their jurisdictions.85 A key 
component of the 2013 Cole memo was its policy of letting states that had 
legalized marijuana and that had strong, effective regulatory systems enforce 
 
78. Boldin, supra note 15.  
79. Memorandum from David W. Ogden, Deputy Att’y Gen. on Investigations & Prosecutions in States 
Authorizing The Medical Use Of Marijuana to Selected U.S. Attorneys (Oct 19, 2009), https://www. 
justice.gov/archives/opa/blog/memorandum-selected-united-state-attorneys-investigations-and-prosecutions-
states (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
80. Id. 
81. Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen. on Guidance Regarding the Ogden Memo in 
Jurisdictions Seeking to Authorize Marijuana for Medical Use to All United States Attorneys (June 29, 2011), 
http://files.ctctcdn.com/201bc6cf001/10f50403-6ee6-4e47-bbc3-ed48d1912bbb.pdf (on file with The University 
of the Pacific Law Review).  
82. Id. 
83. See John Schroyer, The Famous Marijuana Memos: Q&A with Former DOJ Deputy Attorney General 
James Cole, MARIJUANA BUS. DAILY (July 27, 2016), https://mjbizdaily.com/the-famous-marijuana-memos-qa-
with-former-doj-deputy-attorney-general-james-cole/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) 
(explaining how many misread the Ogden memo and assumed it provided blanket protection for all individuals 
in compliance with state medical marijuana laws).  
84. See DOJ to Medical Pot Industry: Government Could Prosecute Dispensaries, Growers, MARIJUANA 
BUS. DAILY (July 1, 2011), https://mjbizdaily.com/doj-to-medical-marijuan-industry-federal-government-could-
prosecute-dispensaries-growers/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (noting how the letter 
would allow the federal government to prosecute medical marijuana dispensaries).  
85. Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen. on Guidance Regarding Marijuana 
Enforcement to All United States Attorneys (Aug. 29, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/ 
3052013829132756857467.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
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their own laws.86 President Obama’s administration took a “hands off” approach 
to marijuana enforcement in states that had enacted laws legalizing marijuana. 
The Trump Administration’s position, however, is not as clear.87 If President 
Trump wanted to, he could easily withdraw the 2013 Cole Memo “with the 
stroke of a pen.”88 In addition, Attorney General Jeff Sessions has voiced 
disapproval of President Obama’s marijuana policies, but has yet to wholly 
embrace or reject the 2013 Cole Memo.89 
The Rohrabacher–Farr Amendment (RFA) is a budget amendment that 
prohibits DOJ funds from being used to prevent states from implementing 
medical marijuana laws.90 Representative Rohrabacher, who co-authored the bill, 
introduced it in 2003, but it was not passed until 2014.91 Representative 
Rohrabacher intended it to do more than “just prevent direct interference with 
state implementation; it [was intended to] also end federal medical cannabis 
raids, arrests, criminal prosecutions, and civil asset forfeiture lawsuits, as well as 
providing current medical cannabis prisoners with a way to petition for their 
release.”92 
One of the most significant cases involving the RFA was the 2016 case of 
U.S. v. McIntosh.93 There, the court stated, “at a minimum, section 542 prohibits 
the DOJ from spending funds from relevant appropriations acts for the 
prosecution of individuals who engaged in conduct permitted by the State 
Medical Marijuana Laws and who fully complied with such laws.”94 Thus, as 
long as the RFA remains in effect, the federal government is prohibited from 
prosecuting “conduct that is allowed by the state’s medical cannabis law.”95 
 
86. Id.  
87. See Christopher Ingraham, Sessions on Enforcing Federal Marijuana Laws: ‘It Won’t Be an Easy 
Decision’, WASH. POST (Jan. 10, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/01/10/ 
sessions-on-enforcing-federal-marijuana-laws-it-wont-be-an-easy-decision/ (on file with The University of the 
Pacific Law Review) (noting how Sessions’ anti-marijuana past, and Trump’s statement that marijuana is a 
states right issue is contradictory and thus leads to uncertainty). 
88. Paul Payne, Atty. General Nominee Major Buzzkill For Pot Industry?, EMERALD REP. (Nov. 20, 
2016), http://www.emeraldreport.com/atty-general-nominee-major-buzzkill-pot-industry/ (on file with The 
University of the Pacific Law Review). 
89. See Ingraham, supra note 87 (explaining that Sessions has neither voiced support for Obama-era 
rules, nor has he signaled his eagerness to get rid of them). 
90. Ben Aldin, California Bill Would Bar Officials From Aiding Federal Crackdown, LEAFLY (Feb 28, 
2017), https://www.leafly.com/news/politics/california-bill-bar-officials-aiding-federal-crackdown (on file with 
The University of the Pacific Law Review).  
91. Somerset, supra note 30. 
92. Federal Marijuana Law, AMERICANS FOR SAFE ACCESS, http://www.safeaccessnow.org/federal_ 
marijuana_law [hereinafter Americans For Safe Access] (on file with The University of the Pacific Law 
Review). 
93. U.S. v. McIntosh, 833 F.3d 1163 (2016). 
94. Id. 
95. Federal Marijuana Law, supra note 92. 
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Although the RFA provides protections for states that implement marijuana 
laws, the amendment must be renewed each fiscal year for it to remain in effect.96 
Although Congress renewed the amendment through September 2017, President 
Trump added a signing statement: “I will treat this provision consistently with 
my constitutional responsibility to take care that the laws be faithfully 
executed.”97 Since marijuana remains illegal under federal law, this language 
suggests that President Trump is reserving the right to disregard the amendment 
entirely.98 Further, Sessions personally asked Congress to “undo federal medical-
marijuana protections” provided by the RFA so that he could prosecute medical-
marijuana providers.99 
C. Economic Context 
Under existing law, California is predicted to experience huge economic 
growth due to the expansion of recreational marijuana.100 Employment statistics 
regarding California’s marijuana industry are rare because the state has not kept 
records since legalizing marijuana for medicinal use in 1996.101 Although some 
studies have been performed, analysts have criticized them for relying on “proxy 
data or invalid assumptions.”102 One study attempted to remedy the shortcomings 
of the previous studies by using official state data from Colorado.103 Employment 
statistics relating to other states were then extrapolated using this official data.104 
 
96. Jacob Sullum, The Federal Ban on Medical Marijuana Was Not Lifted, REASON (Jan. 4, 2016), 
http://reason.com/archives/2016/01/04/the-federal-ban-on-medical-marijuana-was (on file with The University 
of the Pacific Law Review). 
97. Donald J. Trump, Statement by President Donald J. Trump on Signing H.R. 244 into Law, WHITE 
HOUSE (May 5, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/05/05/statement-president-donald-j-
trump-signing-hr-244-law (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
98. See Ingraham, supra note 31 (noting that prior presidents have used similar singing statements to 
ignore policies they disagreed with). 
99. Christopher Ingraham, Jeff Sessions Personally Asked Congress to Let Him Prosecute Medical-
Marijuana Providers, WASH. POST (June 13, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/06/13/jeff-sessions-personally-asked-congress-to-let-
him-prosecute-medical-marijuana-providers/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
100. See California Proposition 64, Marijuana Legalization (2016), BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia. 
org/California_Proposition_64,_Marijuana_Legalization_(2016) [hereinafter Prop. 64 Ballotpedia] (on file with 
The University of the Pacific Law Review) (noting the potential tax revenue from legal marijuana could be as 
high as $1 billion). 
101. See Staggs, supra note 52 (explaining that there are no reliable records related to marijuana in 
California because California hasn’t kept records since passing Prop. 215). 
102. Daniel Wheaton, Legal Weed Could Generate More Than 100,000 Jobs, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB. 
(Nov. 1, 2016, 4:20 PM PST), http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/data-watch/sd-me-weed-jobs-
20161101-story.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
103. Id. 
104. See id. (explaining how researchers used Colorado’s data to make estimates about other states based 
on proportions). 
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The study suggested approving AUMA would create at least 130,432 jobs in 
California.105 This estimate accounted for “everyone along the supply chain: from 
pot sellers to edible ‘chefs.’”106 In another study, the University of the Pacific’s 
Center for Business and Policy Research, Eberhardt School of Business, and 
McGeorge School of Law concluded a more conservative number was realistic: 
nearly 20,000107 Before the 2016 vote, reports also predicted up to $1 billion in 
annual tax revenue from marijuana108 and millions in investment in California’s 
industry if AUMA passed.109 
After Californians passed AUMA, experts predicted the state’s marijuana 
market would grow from about $2.8 billion per year in 2017 to $5.8 billion per 
year in 2018.110 During this period, President Trump’s stance on marijuana was 
relatively unknown. On the one hand, he claimed he supported states’ rights on 
the issue. On the other, the administration had yet to take a firm stance.111 After 
the Trump Administration first suggested “greater enforcement,” investors 
became increasingly hesitant to spend money on ventures with no security.112 In 
 
105. Id. 
106. Id. 
107. What Proposition 64 Means for California Employers, DELFINO MADDEN O’MALLEY COYLE 
KOEWLER, http://delfinomadden.com/what-proposition-64-means-for-california-employers/ (last visited Oct. 6, 
2017) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
108. Prop. 64 Ballotpedia, supra note 100. 
109. See Kevin Smith, These Marijuana Investors Are Ready To Spend Millions If California Passes 
Prop 64, MERCURY NEWS (Nov. 9, 2016, 3:58PM), http://www.mercurynews.com/2016/11/08/these-marijuana-
investors-are-ready-to-spend-millions-if-california-passes-prop-64/ (on file with The University of the Pacific 
Law Review) (explaining how a private investment fund worth millions was being assembled in preparation for 
AUMA being approved).  
110. Todd Campbell, How Big Could the Opportunity Be for Marijuana Stocks in California?, MOTLEY 
FOOL (Jan 22. 2017, 3:02 PM), https://www.fool.com/investing/2017/01/22/how-big-could-the-opportunity-be-
for-marijuana-sto.aspx (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
111. See Melia Robinson, Trump Has Two Paths He Can Take on Marijuana Legalization—Here’s How 
They Could Affect You, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 28, 2017, 11:45 AM), http://www. businessinsider.com/trump-on-
marijuana-legalization-2017-1 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (explaining how it was 
extremely difficult to decipher Trump’s position on marijuana because he changed his mind so many times, and 
his administration had yet to take any action on federal marijuana laws); see also Jeremy Berke, Here’s Where 
President-Elect Donald Trump Stands on Marijuana Legalization, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 9, 2016, 11:38 AM), 
available at http://www.businessinsider.com/where-donald-trump-stands-on-weed-legalization-2016-11 (on file 
with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (noting Trump’s contradictory statements and positions on 
marijuana). 
112. See Jennifer Kaplan, Despite Trump Opposition, Investors Pour Money into Cannabis Industry, 
CANNAFORNIAN NEWS (June 2, 2017), http://www.thecannifornian.com/cannabis-business/despite-trump-
opposition-investors-pour-money-cannabis-industry/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) 
(describing how some investors started to fear entering or continuing to invest in the marijuana industry after 
Session’s nomination); see also Todd Campbell, Will Donald Trump’s Attorney General Jeff Sessions 
Undermine Legal Marijuana?, MOTLEY FOOL (June 14, 2017, 3:02 PM), https://www.fool.com/ 
investing/2017/06/14/will-donald-trumps-attorney-general-jeff-sessions.aspx (on file with The University of the 
Pacific Law Review) (describing how Trump’s nomination of Session created uncertainty for investors, which 
led to a decline in marijuana stocks).  
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response, experts began noting the potential loss in tax revenue due to future 
uncertainty.113 
D. Constitutionality 
According to the Supremacy Clause, federal law is the “supreme law of the 
land.”114 If Congress and a state pass “laws that govern the same activity … 
Congress can . . . preempt (i.e., void) [the] state laws if it so desires.”115 Thus, the 
key detail “in every preemption case is . . . Congress’s preemptive intent.”116 
The Supreme Court notes, “when Congress speaks directly to preemption, 
there is no need to infer congressional intent.”117 If Congress does not mention 
preemption, however, the Court can still infer congressional intent to preempt if 
the State law conflicts with federal law.118 There are two types of conflict: “direct 
conflict and obstacle conflict.”119 Direct “conflict arises when it is physically 
impossible to comply with both state and federal law.”120 
On the other hand, obstacle “conflict arises anytime state law ‘stands as an 
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives 
of Congress.’”121 Thus, preemption under the CSA does not require a state’s law 
to directly conflict; all it requires is that the “law would still arguably undermine 
Congress’s goal of combating drug abuse.”122 Courts have not yet been presented 
with a situation directly analogous to AB 1578 where a state refuses to enforce 
federal marijuana law.123 Therefore, it is unclear whether federal law would 
preempt AB 1578 if it had passed.124 
 
113. See Sean Williams, Marijuana Stock Investors in Awe as California Goes Toe-to-Toe With the 
Trump Administration, MOTLEY FOOL (June 11, 2017 11:03 AM), https://www.fool.com/investing/2017/ 
06/11/marijuana-stock-investors-in-awe-as-california-goe.aspx (on file with The University of the Pacific Law 
Review) (noting the marijuna industry’s projected $1 billion in tax revenue may be in jeopardy if Trump 
increases enforcement).  
114. See Robert Mikos, Preemption Under the Controlled Substances Act, 16 J. OF HEALTH CARE L. & 
POL’Y 5, 9 (2013) (explaining the Supremacy Clause and preemption).  
115. Id. 
116. Id. 
117. Id. 
118. Id. at 10.  
119. Id. 
120. Id. 
121. Id. 
122. Id. 
123. See Chris Weigant, California Considers Historic “Weed Sanctuary” Status, HUFFINGTON POST 
(Apr. 19, 2017, 9:49 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/california-considers-historic-weed-sanctuary-
status_us_58f812c4e4b0b6ca13416110 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (noting that if 
AB 1578 was enacted, it would be the start of a new battle between federal and state government). 
124  Id.  
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The Tenth Amendment states, “[t]he powers not delegated to the United 
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the 
States respectively, or to the people.”125 Courts have interpreted this to stand for 
the proposition “that states do not have to be active participants in the 
enforcement or effectuation of federal acts or regulatory programs.”126 The first 
time the Court addressed such an issue was the 1842 case of Prigg v. Com. of 
Pennsylvania.127 There, the court held that while the states could not physically 
impede the Fugitive Slave Act, they were not required to assist in capturing 
runaways.128 
Furthermore, the Court reaffirmed that idea when looking at a similar issue 
more recently in Printz v. U.S.129 There, it held that, “[t]he Federal Government 
may neither issue directives requiring the States to address particular problems, 
nor command the States’ officers, or those of their political subdivisions, to 
administer or enforce a federal regulatory program.”130 In New York v. U.S., the 
Court noted the federal government’s inability to compel state action may lead to 
situations where the “states will at times have the power to frustrate effectuation 
of some programs.”131 
E. Impetus for AB 1578 
During his campaign, President Trump supported a state’s right to choose 
how to handle medical marijuana legislation—but nominating Jeff Sessions as 
Attorney General might indicate otherwise.132 Sessions previously stated, 
“marijuana is not the kind of thing that ought to be legalized.”133 Further, during 
his confirmation hearing, Sessions stated that, “[he would not] commit to never 
enforcing federal law” with respect to marijuana.134 Similar to President Trump’s 
signing statement on the RFA, Session’s statement creates significant uncertainty 
 
125. U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
126. Mike Maharrey, The Anti-Commandeering Doctrine: An Overview of Four Major Supreme Court 
Cases, TENTH AMENDMENT CTR. (Feb. 3, 2015), http://tenthamendmentcenter.com/2015/02/03/anti-
commandeering-the-legal-basis-for-refusing-to-participate/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law 
Review). 
127. Id. 
128. Boldin, supra note 15. 
129. Maharrey, supra note 126.  
130. Id. 
131. City of New York v. U.S., 179 F.3d 29, 35 (2d Cir. 1999). 
132. McGreevy, supra note 32. 
133. Tom Huddleston, Jr., What Jeff Sessions Said About Marijuana in His Attorney General Hearing, 
FORTUNE, (Jan. 10, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/01/10/jeff-sessions-marijuana-confirmation-hearing/ (on file 
with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
134. Id. 
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as to whether and to what extent President Trump’s administration will enforce 
federal laws that prohibit marijuana in states that have legalized it.135 
Voters in California legalized marijuana for recreational use when they 
passed AUMA, but their will could be overturned if the current administration 
enforces federal laws prohibiting marijuana.136 Californians have long been 
suspicious of the changes and modifications the U.S. Department of Justice has 
made regarding its position on enforcing marijuana laws in the past.137 With these 
suspicions in mind, California legislators took steps to mitigate the risk of a 
potential change to federal law with AB 1578.138 
III. AB 1578 
Assembly Member Jones-Sawyer introduced AB 1578 to prohibit state and 
local authorities from assisting the federal government in investigating marijuana 
activity that is allowed in California, unless federal authorities obtain a court 
order.139 AB 1578 would not have expressly contradicted nor would it have 
implicitly undermined the CSA.140 It would have merely codified California’s 
constitutional right to refrain from enforcing federal laws by prohibiting 
cooperation absent a court order.141 
AB 1578 would have prohibited “a state or local agency . . . [from using] . . . 
agency money, facilities, property, equipment, or personnel to assist a federal 
agency to investigate, detain, detect, report, or arrest a person for . . . marijuana 
. . . activity that is authorized or allowed under [the] law in . . . California.”142 AB 
1578 also would have prohibited “a state or local agency. . . [from responding] 
. . . to a request made by a federal agency or federal entity for information about 
an individual who is authorized or allowed under . . . [California] law to possess 
 
135. Compare Trump, supra note 97 (signaling that President Trump may disregard the RFA because 
marijuana is still illegal under federal law), and Huddleston, supra note 133 (signaling that Sessions is reserving 
the right to enforce federal laws, such as marijuana laws). 
136. Morimune, supra note 16.  
137. See generally Schroyer, supra note 83 (explaining how the marijuana industry read too much into 
the Ogden Memo, so the Cole Memos seemed like policy reversals). 
138. See ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1578, at 3–4 (Apr. 
18, 2017) (explaining how the suspicions of a future crackdown on marijuana prompted the creation of AB 
1578). 
139. Id. 
140. See id. (explaining how AB 1578’s provisions don’t directly conflict with the CSA, they just make 
cooperation with federal authorities more difficult).  
141. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (noting that states cannot be required to 
enforce federal laws). 
142. SENATE COMM. ON PUB. SAFETY, MARIJUANA AND CANNABIS PROGRAMS: COOPERATION WITH 
FEDERAL AUTHORITIES 1 (June 27, 2017), available at https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/bill 
AnalysisClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180AB1578# (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
 2018 / Interaction Between State and Federal Law Enforcement 
464 
. . . marijuana, if the request is made for the purposes of enforcing the Controlled 
Substances Act.”143 
In addition, AB 1578 would have prohibited “a state or local agency . . . 
[from providing] information about a person who has applied for or received a 
license to engage in commercial marijuana or commercial medical cannabis 
activity pursuant to MCRSA or AUMA, if the request is made for the purposes of 
enforcing the . . . Controlled Substances Act.”144 Finally, AB 1578 would have 
prohibited “a state or local agency . . . [from transferring] an individual to federal 
law enforcement, or [detaining] an individual . . . [for] federal authorities, for 
marijuana . . . conduct” that is allowed under California law.145 
IV. ANALYSIS 
Two groups most strongly support legalizing marijuana: those that believe in 
marijuana’s medicinal relief, and marijuana industry investors.146 The most 
fervent opposition has equally strong convictions, either due to their interest in 
preserving the status quo,147 or because of their belief that consuming marijuana 
is immoral.148 Had it passed, AB 1578 might have significantly impacted both 
sides of marijuana legalization.149 
A. Positive Effects of AB 1578 
AB 1578 would have prevented the federal government from easily enforcing 
marijuana laws by requiring a court order for state or local agencies to provide 
assistance.150 Many of the potential benefits of AB 1578 were a result of the 
 
143. Id.  
144. Id.  
145. Id.  
146. See Smith, supra note 109 (explaining how potential investors show strong support for legalizing 
recreational marijuana). 
147. See Patrick McGreevy, California Lawmakers Want to Block Police From Helping Federal Drug 
Agents Take Action Against Marijuana License Holders, L.A. TIMES (Mar 23, 2017, 12:05 AM PST), 
http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-sac-pot-enforcement-legislation-20170323-story.html (on file with The 
University of the Pacific Law Review) (discussing how some law enforcement officers strongly oppose the bill 
because of their interest in keeping their policies the same). 
148. Matthew J. Santucci, The Cultural Dichotomy: In Defense of Marijuana Legalization, FORDHAM 
POL. REV. (Apr. 26, 2017), http://fordhampoliticalreview.org/the-cultural-dichotomy-in-defense-of-marijuana-
legalization/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
149. See Infra Sections A & B (discussing how AB 1578 will provide protections to those in favor, and 
will continue policies which the opposition disapproves of).  
150. See ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1578, at 1 (Apr. 18, 
2017) (explaining how AB 1578 requires federal authorities to get a court order before receiving assistance from 
local agencies). 
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marijuana-permissive policies that developed under previous administrations.151 
Prior to the Trump administration, legal marijuana in California was expected to 
generate numerous benefits.152 For California, ensuring that future benefits 
accrue is as simple as not changing anything and continuing to operate under the 
more lenient policies seen during President Obama’s administration.153 After 
President Trump’s election, however, California’s marijuana supporters feared 
the federal government would attempt to increase enforcement.154 AB 1578 
aimed to prevent California’s state and local tax funded resources from being 
used by the current presidential administration to enforce federal marijuana 
laws.155 
1. How Will AB 1578 Affect California’s Economy? 
One of the most widely discussed benefits of legalizing marijuana is the huge 
economic opportunity it presents.156 The following Subpart will examine the 
potential effects of AB 1578 on marijuana-related investments.157 Then it will 
discuss AB 1578’s potential effect on job creation.158 Finally, this Subpart will 
analyze AB 1578’s potential effect on tax revenue in California.159 
  
 
151. See Prop. 64 Official Voter Information Guide, VOTER GUIDES, http://voterguide.sos.ca.gov/en/ 
propositions/64/analysis.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2017) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) 
(describing the potential tax revenue from marijuana prior to Trump’s election); see also Ike Brannon, Legalize 
Marijuana and Reduce Deaths From Drug Abuse, HILL (July 8, 2016, 7:34 AM EDT), http://thehill.com/ 
blogs/pundits-blog/healthcare/286965-legalize-marijuana-and-reduce-deaths-from-drug-abuse (on file with The 
University of the Pacific Law Review) (explaining the expected decrease in opioid deaths from legalizing 
marijuana prior to Trump); see also Wheaton, supra note 102 (explaining that legal marijuana was expected to 
generate over 100,000 jobs in California prior to Trump). 
152. Id.  
153. See Hamilton, supra note 17 (discussing legal marijuana’s huge potential for job creation, but noting 
that the “rosy projection” is contingent upon federal enforcement of marijuana laws staying the same). 
154. See Kaplan, supra note 112 (describing how some investors started to fear entering or continuing to 
invest in the marijuana industry after Session’s nomination); see also Campbell, supra note 112 (describing how 
Trump’s nomination of Session created uncertainty for investors, which led to a decline in marijuana stocks).  
155. Morimune, supra note 16. 
156. See Prop. 64 Official Voter Information Guide, supra note 151 (noting the potential tax revenue 
from legal marijuana could be as high as $1 billion); see also Wheaton, supra note 102 (explaining that legal 
marijuana was could generate over 100,000 jobs in California); see also Smith, supra note 109 (noting that 
investors were ready to spend millions on California’s marijuana industry if AUMA passed). 
157. See infra Parts IV.i. 
158. See infra Parts IV.ii. 
159. See infra Parts IV.iii. 
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a. AB 1578 Might Have Increased Marijuana-Related Investment in 
California 
Initially, the Trump administration and its nomination of Jeff Sessions for 
Attorney General had little effect on the rising rate and success of marijuana-
related investments.160 But Sean Spicer’s comments in March of 2017 had a 
negative impact on marijuana markets.161 He predicted “greater enforcement” of 
federal marijuana laws and as a result, both large and small marijuana stocks 
recorded losses after Spicer’s announcement.162 Thus, it is clear businesses were 
willing to invest under the permissive policies enacted before President Trump, 
but were unwilling when policies were predicted to shift in the direction of 
greater enforcement.163 
A statute that ensures that the effects of Obama-era marijuana policies 
continue to remain in force could ease investors’ fears and help to facilitate 
future growth in the industry.164 Past trends demonstrate businesses are willing to 
invest in the marijuana industry—even with the conflicting federal law—so long 
as they have assurances federal authorities will not target them if they are 
compliant with state law.165 Thus, since AB 1578 would have effectively ensured 
that federal authorities could not easily target persons compliant with state law,166 
 
160. See Debra Borchardt, Marijuana Industry Raises Over $1 Billion In 2016, FORBES (Dec. 21, 2016 
9:04 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/debraborchardt/2016/12/21/marijuana-industry-raises-over-1-billion-
in-2016/#5cc6a1ed391d (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (describing the continued 
growth of the marijuana industry that initially occurred, even after Trump was elected). 
161. Aaron Smith, Trump Is a Buzzkill For Pot Stocks, CNN MONEY (Mar. 1, 2017, 3:02 PM EST), 
http://money.cnn.com/2017/03/01/investing/marijuana-stocks-trump/?iid=EL (on file with The University of the 
Pacific Law Review) (describing the decline in marijuana stocks after Spicer’s announcement about greater 
enforcement). 
162. Id. 
163. Compare Borchardt, supra note 160 (describing the continued growth of the marijuana industry that 
occurred after Trump was elected, but before the announcement about greater enforcement), with Smith, supra 
note 161 (describing the decline in marijuana stocks after Spicer’s announcement about “greater enforcement”). 
164. See Williams, supra note 113 (explaining how AB 1578 could provide some protection for 
marijuana investors, easing their fears). 
165. See ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1578, at 3-4 (Apr. 
18, 2017) (explaining that the Obama-era policies didn’t target individuals who were compliant with state law); 
see also Debra Borchardt, Sessions Confirmed As Attorney General, Wary Cannabis Industry Extends Olive 
Branch, FORBES (Feb. 8, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/debraborchardt/2017/02/08/sessions-confirmed-
as-attorney-general-wary-cannabis-industry-extends-olive-branch/#682858d8474b (on file with The University 
of the Pacific Law Review) (describing the growth of the marijuana industry under the Obama-era policies). 
166. See Oscar Pascual, California Introduces Bill to Block Police From Assisting Federal Raids on 
Legal Pot, SF GATE (Mar 24, 2017, 9:58 AM PST), http://blog.sfgate.com/smellthetruth/2017/03/24/california-
introduces-bill-to-block-police-from-assisting-federal-raids-on-legal-pot/ (on file with The University of the 
Pacific Law Review) (explaining how difficult and dangerous it can be for federal authorities to enforce federal 
marijuana law without help from state or local authorities); see also Aldin, supra note 90 (noting that federal 
enforcement of marijuana laws would require “tremendous” resources).  
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businesses would have been less hesitant to invest in California’s marijuana 
industry.167 
b. AB 1578 Might Have Encouraged Job Creation 
One caveat about the job-creation estimates is that the studies are contingent 
upon whether federal authorities continue the Obama-era policy of letting states 
that have legalized marijuana use the regulatory systems they have put in 
place.168 The Trump administration has yet to take any concrete steps towards 
changing the federal authorities’ approach to marijuana enforcement, but some of 
its actions may signal potential changes.169 Spicer’s statement about expecting 
greater enforcement and Sessions’ request to Congress are the most solid 
indications of how the Trump administration plans to enforce federal marijuana 
laws.170 So to the extent the Trump administration does start to enforce federal 
marijuana laws, AB 1578 may help create jobs in California’s marijuana industry 
by providing protections to people who comply with state law.171 
Even if the actual number of jobs created in California by the marijuana 
industry is on the low-end of the estimates (20,000), it would still be significant 
considering the entire coal industry— which played an important role in 
President Trump’s campaign— only employs about 76,000 people throughout the 
entire U.S.172 In addition, these estimates only account for the near future; by 
 
167. See Williams, supra note 113 (explaining how AB 1578 could provide some protection for 
marijuana investors, easing their fears). 
168. See Hamilton, supra note 17 (discussing legal marijuana’s huge potential for job creation, but noting 
that the “rosy projection” is contingent upon federal enforcement of marijuana laws staying the same). 
169. See John Wagner & Matt Zapotosky, Spicer: Feds Could Step Up Enforcement Against Marijuana 
Use in States, WASH. POST (Feb 23, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/ 
2017/02/23/spicer-feds-could-step-up-anti-pot-enforcement-in-states-where-recreational-marijuana-is-legal/ (on 
file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (noting that White House press secretary Sean Spicer said 
that he expects states to be subject to “greater enforcement” of federal laws against marijuana use); see also 
Sean Williams, Surprise! Jeff Sessions Wants to Trample States’ Rights and Prosecute Medical Marijuana 
Businesses, MOTLEY FOOL (June 24, 2017, 9:13 AM), https://www.fool. com/investing/2017/06/24/surprise-
jeff-sessions-wants-to-trample-states-rig.aspx (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (Sessions 
sent a letter to Congressional leaders requesting the repeal of the Rohrabacher-Farr Amendment so that he could 
enforce federal marijuana laws).  
170. See Wagner & Zapotosky, supra note 169 (noting that White House press secretary Sean Spicer said 
that he expects states to be subject to “greater enforcement” of federal laws against marijuana use); see also 
Williams supra note 169 (Sessions sent a letter to Congressional leaders requesting the repeal of the 
Rohrabacher-Farr Amendment so that he could enforce federal marijuana laws).  
171. See Hamilton, supra note 17 (discussing how the large growth in jobs in contingent upon Obama-era 
policies remaining in force, since AB 1578 will do just that, it may help to create jobs). 
172. Christopher Ingraham, The Entire Coal Industry Employs Less People than Arby’s, WASH. POST 
(Mar. 31, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/03/31/8-surprisingly-small-industries-
that-employ-more-people-than-coal/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (explaining that 
coal, an industry which played a large role in Trump’s campaign, only employed about 76,000 people in the 
United States as of 2014).  
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2020, it is estimated that the marijuana industry will employ 250,000 people 
nationwide.173 While not all of this growth will be attributed to California’s 
marijuana industry, it is fair to say that a large portion of the growth will be 
because California is the most populous state in the United States.174 
AB 1578 might have helped to create marijuana related jobs in California by 
ensuring that protections provided under the Obama administration would persist, 
even if the federal government attempts to take a different approach.175 Without 
the protection currently provided under the Obama-era policies, it is likely that 
the marijuana industry will continue to grow, but not anywhere near the scale 
predicted.176 
c. AB 1578 Might Have Increased Tax Revenue 
Leading up to the vote on AUMA, one of the main arguments for why 
recreational marijuana should be legalized was the enormous potential for tax 
revenue.177 Many analysts predict that if marijuana were legalized for 
recreational use, it would lead to an increase of $1 billion in tax revenue 
annually, and as much as $11 billion over the next decade.178 Two assumptions 
about these estimates are worth noting.179 First, the estimated increases assume 
that all marijuana sold on the black market is untaxed.180 Since taxes are currently 
 
173. Melia Robinson, Legal Marijuana Could Overtake Manufacturing in Job Creation By 2020, BUS. 
INSIDER (Mar. 3, 2017, 1:45 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/legal-marijuana-job-creation-projections-
2017-3 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).  
174. See Katy Steinmetz, 7 Reasons President Trump is Unlikely to Fight Legal Marijuana, TIME (Dec. 
7, 2016), http://time.com/4594445/legal-marijuana-trump-sessions-policy/ (on file with The University of the 
Pacific Law Review) (noting that California is the most populated state). 
175. See ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1578, at 3–4 (Apr. 
18, 2017) (explaining that California’s marijuana industry was provided protections under the Obama 
administration, which AB 1578 intends to continue).  
176. See Keith Speights, How Big Will the Trump Slump Be for Marijuana Stocks?, MOTLEY FOOl (May 
5, 2017, 11:04AM), https://www.fool.com/investing/2017/03/05/how-big-will-the-trump-slump-be-for-
marijuana-stoc.aspx (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (explaining that if the Trump 
administration successfully increased enforcement on recreational marijuana, it could decrease the market size 
for marijuana growers from 6.7 to 1.5 million consumers, however, the medical market could still expand). 
177. Proposition 64 Arguments and Rebuttals, OFFICIAL VOTER INFO. GUIDE, http://voterguide. 
sos.ca.gov/en/propositions/64/arguments-rebuttals.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2017) (on file with The University of 
the Pacific Law Review). 
178. Id.; Proposition 64, LEGIS. ANALYST’S OFFICE (Nov. 8, 2016), http://www.lao.ca.gov/ 
BallotAnalysis/Proposition?number=64&year=2016 (last visited Oct. 6, 2017) (on file with The University of 
the Pacific Law Review). 
179. See id. (noting that collecting unpaid taxes would bring in $1 billion in revenue); see also Hamilton, 
supra note 17 (explaining that the future where legal marijuana generates billions of dollars in sales is 
contingent upon Trump not increasing enforcement). 
180. Proposition 64 Arguments and Rebuttals, supra note 177 
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not being collected for these transactions, beginning to collect any sort of tax 
would lead to marked increases.181 
Second, the estimates assumed that the Trump administration would not 
increase federal enforcement of marijuana laws.182 These estimates were 
generated during a period of confusion when the Trump administration’s position 
on marijuana laws was relatively unknown.183 After the Trump administration’s 
position became clear, experts began to note the potential loss in tax revenue.184 
Some conservatively claimed the “revenue [would merely be] in jeopardy if the 
Trump administration tightened federal regulations surrounding marijuana.”185 
Others more boldly predicted that increased enforcement could “endanger 
hundreds of millions of dollars in state tax revenue.”186 Regardless of the specific 
amount, it is clear that AB 1578 and laws like it would have helped to ensure 
higher levels of tax revenue by preventing federal authorities from easily 
targeting state law compliant marijuana users.187 
2. How Would AB 1578 Have Affected Public Health? 
A decrease in human opioid deaths is a concrete benefit of legalizing 
marijuana.188 A JAMA Network study shows states with medical marijuana laws 
had “twenty-five percent fewer opiate overdose deaths than states without such 
laws.”189 Further, the effect appeared to grow over time, likely because more 
people took advantage of the programs each year.190 
Considering this, the inverse may have the opposite effect.191 If the federal 
government were to increase enforcement of marijuana laws, that would lead to a 
decrease in people taking advantage of legal marijuana programs.192 In turn, this 
 
181. Id.; see also Proposition 64, supra note 178 (noting that collecting unpaid taxes would bring in $1 
billion in revenue).  
182. See Hamilton, supra note 17 (explaining that the future where legal marijuana generates billions of 
dollars in sales is contingent upon Trump not increasing enforcement).  
183. See Ingraham, supra note 87 (noting how Session’s anti-marijuana past, and Trump’s belief that 
marijuana is a states right issue is contradictory and thus leads to uncertainty). 
184. Williams, supra note 113. 
185. Id. 
186. Aldin, supra note 90. 
187. See id. (explaining how “widespread enforcement could endanger hundreds of millions of dollars in 
tax revenue”). 
188. See Ingraham, supra note 53 (discussing the trend of decreasing deaths from opioids in states that 
legalized marijuana).  
189. Id. 
190. Id. 
191. See id. (noting the trend increases annually, likely because more people take advantage of the 
programs each year, but if less people enrolled each year, this could lead to a trend of increasing deaths). 
192. Id. 
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could lead to a growing trend of deaths by opiates.193 AB 1578 would have made 
it more difficult, practically, for the federal government to increase enforcement 
of federal marijuana laws by forcing them to use their own man power, 
thereby,194 ensuring that the number of people taking advantage of the programs 
continues to rise.195 Thus, AB 1578 would have ensured that the trend of 
decreasing deaths by opiates continued into the future.196 
3. What Effect Will AB 1578 have on Voter Efficacy? 
In 1996, 55.58% of Californians voted to allow the medicinal use of 
marijuana197 and in 2016, 57.13% voted to allow recreational marijuana use.198 
These numbers demonstrate that Californians overwhelmingly support marijuana 
legalization.199 The recent developments and positive trends predicted in 
California’s marijuana industry did in fact materialize, but they will only 
continue to do so if the federal government does not enforce federal marijuana 
laws to a greater degree.200 According to AB 1578’s authors, the will of 
California’s voters and the legislature would be undermined if the Trump 
administration were allowed to force local and state authorities to assist in 
enforcing federal marijuana laws.201 
In the city of Vallejo, 57.6% voted to allow recreational marijuana in 
California.202 Vallejo’s elected representative, Assemblyman Tim Grayson, 
however, voted against AB 1578, citing public safety as his biggest concern.203 
The president of a local marijuana business stated that she was “surprised” by 
 
193. Id. 
194. See Pascual, supra note 166 (explaining how difficult and dangerous it can be for federal authorities 
to enforce federal marijuana law without help from state or local authorities); see also Aldin, supra note 90 
(noting that federal enforcement of marijuana laws would require “tremendous” resources).  
195. See Ingraham, supra note 53 (explaining how the trend of decreasing opiate deaths seems to increase 
as time goes on). 
196. Id. 
197. California Proposition 215, the Medical Marijuana Initiative (1996), BALLOTPEDIA, 
https://ballotpedia.org/California_Proposition_215,_the_Medical_Marijuana_Initiative_(1996) (last visited Oct. 
6, 2017) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
198. Prop. 64 Ballotpedia, supra note 100. 
199. See California Voters Overwhelmingly Approve Marijuana Legalization, supra note 46.  
200. See Hamilton, supra note 17 (explaining that the future where legal marijuana generates vast tax 
revenue is contingent upon Trump not increasing enforcement).  
201. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1578, at 3–4 (Apr. 18, 
2017). 
202. Solano County’s Updated Election Day Results, DAILY REPUBLIC (Nov. 9, 2016), http://www.daily 
republic.com/solano-news/fairfield/solano-county-election-day-results-nov-8-2016/ (on file with The University 
of the Pacific Law Review). 
203. John Glidden, Assembly Approves Cannabis Protection; Grayson Votes Against, TIMES HERALD 
LEGISLATURE (June 6, 2017, 4:57 PM PDT), http://www.timesheraldonline.com/article/NH/20170606/ 
NEWS/170609912 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).  
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Grayson’s vote and that it was like saying, “I don’t care about the views of my 
constituents.”204 Like voters who are upset that Hilary Clinton won the popular 
vote but lost the election, Vallejo constituents are upset that Grayson did not heed 
their votes.205 Because Californians overwhelmingly support marijuana 
legalization,206 enforcement of federal marijuana laws using California’s 
resources would be contrary to the voters’ will.207 AB 1578 would have 
reinforced voter faith in California’s system by ensuring that California’s 
resources were not used to enforce federal marijuana laws that are contrary to the 
will of California’s voters, should the Trump Administration decide to increase 
enforcement of federal marijuana laws.208 
B. Argument by Opponents of AB 1578 
Many arguments made by AB 1578’s supporters are not novel.209 They are 
simply reiterating the arguments that formed the basis for the Obama-era 
approach in the first place.210 The opponents’ arguments, however, introduce new 
perspectives because they relate to the anti-cooperation aspect of AB 1578 rather 
than the marijuana-permissive aspect.211 The following section will discuss how 
AB 1578 could have affected public safety.212 Then, it will discuss how AB 1578 
could have affected cooperation with state and local authorities.213 Next, this 
section will discuss what effect AB 1578 would have had on rule of law.214 
 
204. Id.  
205. Id.; see also Eric Levenson, ‘Not My President’s Day’ Protesters Rally to Oppose Trump, CNN 
(Feb. 21, 2017, 1:18AM ET), http://www.cnn.com/2017/02/20/us/not-my-presidents-day-protests/index.html 
(on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (discussing the anger that some felt over Trump losing 
the popular vote but winning the election because it is not representative of the will of the people). 
206. See California Voters Overwhelmingly Approve Marijuana Legalization, supra note 46. 
207. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1578, at 3–4 (Apr. 18, 
2017); see also Steinmetz, supra note 174 (explaining that since 28 states have legalized marijuana, waging a 
war on marijuana would be contrary to the will of many voters).  
208. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1578, at 3–4 (Apr. 18, 
2017). 
209. Michael Vitiello, Why the Initiative Process Is the Wrong Way to Go: Lessons We Should Have 
Learned from Proposition 215, 43 MCGEORGE L. REV. 63, 63 (2013) (describing the arguments made during a 
debate about legalization as “familiar” and “unenlightening” because they were the same ones that have been 
made in the past). 
210. See Hamilton, supra note 17 (discussing legal marijuana’s huge potential for job creation, but noting 
that the “rosy projection” is contingent upon federal enforcement of marijuana laws staying the same). 
211. See Glidden, supra note 203 (noting that AB 1578 “interferes with local law enforcement’s ability to 
with with other agencies”). 
212. Infra Part IV.B.1. 
213. Infra Part IV.B.2. 
214. Infra Part IV.B.3. 
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Finally, it will discuss whether AB 1578 would have violated the 2013 Cole 
Memo.215 
1. How Would AB 1578  Have Affected Public Safety? 
Opponents of AB 1578 argue that existing laws allowing for marijuana and 
the protections provided by AB 1578 make the public less safe.216 Specifically, 
they argue that AB 1578 could decrease public safety by increasing violent 
crime217 or increasing the number of deaths from driving under the influence of 
marijuana.218 Attorney General Jeff Sessions recently expressed his concern 
about increasing violence, “[e]xperts are telling me there’s more violence around 
marijuana than one would think and there’s big money involved.”219 Proponents 
of legalization were surprised when they heard this comment because numerous 
studies have suggested exactly the opposite.220 Rather than increasing the rate of 
violent crime, legalizing marijuana can either have no effect,221 or it can decrease 
the rate of violent crimes.222 Given the general consensus on these types of 
studies, it is unlikely that AB 1578 would have increased the rate of violent crime 
in California.223 
Opponents of AB 1578 also cite increased rates of death from driving under 
the influence of marijuana as a concern.224 With some studies claiming that 
legalizing marijuana increases deaths from DUI,225 and some claiming it 
 
215. Infra Part IV.B.4. 
216. McGreevy, supra note 57 (explaining how some opponents cite a study that claims that states that 
legalized marijuana saw more marijuana-related traffic deaths); see also No Correlation Between Medical 
Marijuana Legalization, Crime Increase, supra note 61 (explaining how some argue that marijuana leads to 
higher crime rates). 
217. Pyke, supra note 61 (noting how Sessions claimed that marijuana was linked to violence). 
218. See McGreevy, supra note 57 (explaining how some opponents cite a study that claims that states 
that legalized marijuana saw more marijuana-related traffic deaths). 
219. Pyke, supra note 61. 
220. See id. (explaining that violent crime rates tend to decrease where marijuana is legalized); see also 
No Correlation Between Medical Marijuana Legalization, Crime Increase, supra note 61 (explaining that 
legalizing marijuana is not an indicator of increased crime, rather, it may be the opposite). 
221. See Dills et al., supra note 62 (explaining that their studies are not conclusive either way, it appears 
that legalizing marijuana has no noticeable effect on crime rates) 
222. See Pyke, supra note 61 (explaining that violent crime rates tend to decrease where marijuana is 
legalized). 
223. See Dills et al., supra note 62 (explaining that their studies are not conclusive either way, it appears 
that legalizing marijuana has no noticeable effect on crime rates); see also Pyke, supra note 61 (explaining that 
violent crime rates tend to decrease where marijuana is legalized). 
224. McGreevy, supra note 57. 
225. Id. (noting that the RMHIDTA study found that states that legalized marijuana saw increased 
marijuana-related deaths); see also Johnson, supra note 57 (explaining that since Washington legalized 
marijuana, there has been a significant increase in fatal crashes involving marijuana).  
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decreases deaths from DUI,226 there is no clear consensus. However, the results 
of both studies showing an increase in DUI deaths should be taken with a grain 
of salt.227 The RMHIDTA study was based on “marijuana-related” deaths, and 
the AAA study was based on “The percentage of drivers involved in fatal crashes 
who recently used marijuana.”228 Both studies acknowledge the weakness of their 
unit of measurement, and concede that, “testing positive for THC doesn’t 
necessarily mean the driver was impaired or [even] at fault for the crash.”229 
Further, “The AAA report added that many marijuana-positive drivers also had 
alcohol and other drugs in their system, ‘which in some cases likely contributed 
more significantly to the crash than did the THC.’”230 Although both studies 
suggesting that marijuana increases the rate of fatal DUI’s may have weaknesses, 
the existence of potentially conflicting results means it would be improper to 
conclude that AB 1578 would have certainly decreased the death rate from 
driving under the influence of marijuana.231 However, it is safe to say that it is 
likely that AB 1578 would not have endangered public safety in terms of 
increasing violent crime rates.232 
2. How Would AB 1578  Have Affected Cooperation with State and Local 
Authorities? 
A major concern of many law enforcement officers and lawmakers was that 
AB 1578 was overly restrictive because it unnecessarily prevented cooperation 
with federal authorities.233 AB 1578 would have prevented a state or local agency 
from expending resources to assist federal authorities, responding to a request by 
federal authorities, providing information to federal authorities, or transferring an 
individual to federal authorities without a court order.234 Opponents of AB 1578 
 
226. Columbia Study, supra note 57. 
227. See Vanessa Schipani, Unpacking Pot’s Impact in Colorado, FACTCHECK (Aug. 19, 2016), 
http://www.factcheck.org/2016/08/unpacking-pots-impact-in-colorado/ (on file with The University of the 
Pacific Law Review) (noting how both studies caution that “marijuna-related” or testing positive for THC 
“doesn’t necessarily mean the driver was impaired or at fault for the crash”).  
228. Id. 
229. Id. 
230. Id. 
231. See id. (noting that both studies fail to conclusively prove that legalizing marijuana leads to surges in 
traffic fatalities); see also Columbia Study, supra note 57 (noting that traffic deaths tend to fall in states that 
have legalized marijuana).  
232. See Pyke, supra note 61 (explaining that violent crime rates tend to decrease where marijuana is 
legalized), see also Dills et al., supra note 62 (explaining that their studies are not conclusive either way, it 
appears that legalizing marijuana has no noticeable effect on crime rates).  
233. See Glidden, supra note 203 (noting that AB 1578 “interferes with local law enforcement’s ability to 
with with other agencies”). 
234. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1578, at 1 (Apr. 18, 
2017). 
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claimed that “local authorities often work with federal agencies on investigations 
that may uncover both state and federal violations, such as money laundering, 
diverting marijuana out of state for sales, and environmental damage from 
outdoor pot farms.”235 In these situations, it is in the best interest of both federal 
and state authorities if the illegal activities are shut down.236 
Opponents believed AB 1578 would put state and local authorities at a 
disadvantage because they could not assist federal authorities without a court 
order, leading to more inefficiency in law enforcement.237 In addition, some 
opponents claimed “local law enforcement would be put in ‘harm’s way’ if there 
was no cooperation with federal drug enforcement officers.”238 However, 
opponents of AB 1578 might have overstated their fears.239 While AB 1578 
would have prevented state cooperation with federal authorities without a court 
order for enumerated actions, cooperation would still have been possible if the 
federal agency received a court order signed by a judge.240 AB 1578 was not 
meant to prevent cooperation in all situations and the author “said he was open to 
revising the bill language to make it clear he wanted to allow cooperation 
between locals and federal agents in cases where state and federal marijuana laws 
were being violated.241 
Courts have not yet addressed AB 1578’s issues and it is therefore unclear 
how courts would approach it in the future.242 AB 1578’s strict language would 
have made cooperation between state and federal authorities more difficult, but 
the exact degree of difficulty would have depended on how courts handled 
requests by federal agencies.243 Ultimately, these concerns might have been  
 
235. See Other Voices: ‘Sanctuary state’ Rules For Pot Unwise, DESERT SUN (May 19, 2017, 1:04 PM 
PT), http://www.desertsun.com/story/opinion/editorials/2017/05/19/other-voices-la-times-sanctuary-state-rules-
pot-unwise/333460001/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
236. See id. (noting that investigations “may uncover both state and federal violations”).  
237. See id. (noting that AB 1578 prevents types of cooperation that would have been allowed 
previously); see also The Role of State & Local Enforcement in Immigration Matters and Reasons to Resist 
Sanctuary Policies, FED’N FOR AMERICAN IMMIGR. REFORM (Jan. 2016), http://www.fairus.org/issue/the-role-
of-state-local-law-enforcement-in-immigration-matters (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) 
(describing how laws that prevent cooperation lead to wasting of taxpayer resources).  
238. Patrick Mcgreevy, California Could Be a ‘Sanctuary State’ From Federal Pot Laws, Thanks to 
Razor-Thin Vote, L.A. TIMES (June 1 2017, 9:20 PM), http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-ca-marijuana-
enforcement-bill-20170601-story.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
239. Id.  
240. See id. (explaining how AB 1578’s author wanted to clarify that cooperation would still be possible). 
241. Id. 
242. See No Sanctuary For Marijuana in California, L.A. TIMES (May 16, 2017, 4:00AM), http://www. 
latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-marijuana-sanctuary-20170516-story.html (on file with The University of 
the Pacific Law Review) (explaining that Colorado and Washington previously introduced similar bills, but 
failed to implement them, meaning that California’s would be the first). 
243. See id. (noting that Colorado and Washington failed to implement their bills, thus no case law has 
developed yet).  
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overshadowed by the fact that the purpose of AB 1578 was to reinforce the will 
of California voters.244 
3. Would AB 1578 Have Presented Preemption Issues? 
When states previously considered refusing to cooperate with the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) on a plan to control greenhouse gas 
emissions, there were concerns that this would undermine the rule of law, and 
send the message that states could choose not to implement federal policies they 
disagreed with.245 Had AB 1578 been promulgated, and had California essentially 
been granted the legal right to refuse to cooperate with federal marijuana policy, 
other states and local governments might have followed suit.246 This has already 
started to occur, as Illinois, Maryland, Nevada, and New York have followed 
California’s lead and introduced bills to restrict cooperation with federal 
immigration policies.247 
According to the Supremacy Clause, federal law preempts state law when the 
laws conflict.248 Courts may find that laws conflict when the “state law ‘stands as 
an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and 
objectives of Congress.’”249 Since AB 1578 would have made cooperation 
between state and federal authorities more difficult, the argument could be made 
that it presents an obstacle conflict.250 The manner in which the Court would 
conclude on such an argument is not clear because “[o]bstacle preemption is a 
notoriously difficult test to apply.”251 Since obstacle preemption “requires courts 
to look beyond statutory text to divine congressional purposes and to determine 
whether any number of distinct state laws might undermine those purposes” it is 
 
244. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1578, at 3–4 (Apr. 18, 
2017). 
245. See Jonathan H. Adler, Yes, Gov. Whitman, States May Choose Which Federal Laws to Implement, 
WASH. POST (Mar. 16, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/03/16/yes-
gov-whitman-states-may-choose-which-federal-laws-to-implement/) (on file with The University of the Pacific 
Law Review). 
246. See Mike Maharrey, Federal Report: State Noncompliance is Nullification, TENTH AMENDMENT 
CTR. (Nov. 11, 2016), http://tenthamendmentcenter.com/2016/11/11/federal-report-state-noncompliance-is-
nullification/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (explaining how once California decided 
to legalize medicinal marijuana, it set off a “tsunami” of other states that followed). 
247. See Jennifer Medina & Jess Bidgood, California Moves to Become ‘Sanctuary State,’ and Others 
Look to Follow, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/10/us/sanctuary-states-
immigration.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
248. Mikos, supra note 114, at 9. 
249. Id. at 10.  
250. See id. (noting that an obstacle conflict would arise if a policy stoop as an obstacle to the objectives 
of Congress—curbing illicit drug use); see also ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE 
ANALYSIS OF AB 1578, at 1 (Apr. 18, 2017) (noting that AB 1578 makes cooperation between state and federal 
authorities more difficult).  
251. Mikos, supra note 114, at 25. 
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“[n]o wonder . . . that courts and lawmakers have struggled . . . to understand 
preemption in the context of state marijuana law reforms.”252 
 Even if AB 1578 was preempted by the CSA, the federal government might 
have had trouble effectively enforcing federal marijuana laws.253 They simply do 
not have the manpower to enforce the laws entirely by themselves.254 Indeed, that 
is the very reason they have historically relied on local law enforcement 
assistance.255 Although local law enforcement has traditionally assisted federal 
authorities in enforcing marijuana laws, local law enforcement was not obligated 
to do so.256 Indeed, the Tenth Amendment gives the states the powers not 
delegated to the federal government by the Constitution—such as the right to 
decide how to carry out enforcement of federal marijuana laws.257 And the Court 
has repeatedly reaffirmed the idea that “Federal Government may neither issue 
directives requiring the States to address particular problems, nor command the 
States’ officers, or those of their political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a 
federal regulatory program.”258  Accordingly, AB 1578, arguably would have 
merely codified a right that already existed: the right of California (or any state, 
for that matter) to not be compelled to enforce federal laws.259 Moreover, the 
Trump administration remains free to enforce federal without California’s 
help.260 But without this help, effective enforcement would be extremely difficult 
absent a massive increase in federal manpower.261 
Alcohol prohibition was unsuccessful and was ultimately repealed due to the 
lack of state cooperation with the federal government.262 Fox News senior 
judicial analyst Judge Andrew Napolitano has stated that a single state 
withdrawing all resources and participation in federal marijuana prohibition 
 
252. Id. at 26. 
253. See Pascual, supra note 166 (explaining how difficult and dangerous it can be for federal authorities 
to enforce federal marijuana law without help from state or local authorities); see also Aldin, supra note 90 
(noting that federal enforcement of marijuana laws would require “tremendous” resources). 
254. Id.  
255. Id. 
256. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (noting that states cannot be required to 
enforce federal laws).  
257. US. CONST. amend. X. 
258. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 935. 
259. See id. (noting that the federal government is not able to commandeer the states’ officers because it 
would violate the Tenth Amendment). 
260. See Pascual, supra note 166 (explaining how difficult and dangerous it can be for federal authorities 
to enforce federal marijuana law without help from state or local authorities. 
261. See id. (explaining how difficult and dangerous it can be for federal authorities to enforce federal 
marijuana law without help from state or local authorities); see also Aldin, supra note 90 (noting that federal 
enforcement of marijuana laws would require “tremendous” resources). 
262. See The Repeal of Prohibition, PROHIBITION: AN INTERACTIVE HIST., http://prohibition. 
themobmuseum.org/the-history/the-end-of-prohibition/repeal-of-prohibition/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2017) (on file 
with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (explaining how lack of state enforcement played a large role in 
the failure of prohibition). 
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could effectively end it.263 Currently, marijuana prohibition arguably parallels 
alcohol prohibition in this respect.264 
Cooperation proved to be crucial for effectiveness during prohibition of 
alcohol.265 Similarly, if the federal government can’t get states to cooperate on 
marijuana enforcement, the regulation it may go the way of the 18th 
amendment.266 Eight years after the prohibition of alcohol, 28 states completely 
ceased all funding for the enforcement of prohibition;267 as of 2017, 29 states 
allow for medical marijuana use, and eight allow for recreational use.268 In 1926, 
81% of people who participated in a poll conducted by the Newspaper Enterprise 
Association favored modifying or repealing the Eighteenth Amendment;269 in 
2017, 60% of Americans who participated in a poll conducted by Quinnipiac 
University supported legalizing marijuana, and 94% approved of its medical use 
if prescribed by a doctor.270 After years of ineffective enforcement, Congress 
repealed the Eighteenth Amendment, and brought an end to Prohibition.271 
Similarly, AB 1578 and similar laws in other states, which lead to ineffective 
enforcement by the federal government, might have very well resulted in the 
repeal of federal marijuana laws.272 
AB 1578 would have prevented state cooperation with federal authorities, 
and if California was successful in implementing AB 1578, other states might 
have followed suit.273 Colorado and Washington previously introduced similar 
bills, but failed to implement them for fear of the resulting complications, and 
sparking federal intervention.274 Without aid from state or local authorities, 
effective enforcement would be extremely difficult.275 Additionally, if the 
 
263. Boldin, supra note 15. 
264. See The Repeal of Prohibition, supra note 262 (explaining how lack of state enforcement played a 
large role in the failure of prohibition). 
265. See The Repeal of Prohibition, supra note 262.  
266. See id. (noting how the lack of state involvement in enforcement of prohibition led to its demise); 
see also Boldin, supra note 15 (noting that states could end federal prohibition of marijuana by withdrawing 
resources). 
267. Michael Boldin, Dec. 5 1933: Prohibition Repealed After State Resistance Lilled the Law, TENTH 
AMENDMENT CTR. (Dec. 5, 2013), http://blog.tenthamendmentcenter.com/2013/12/dec-5-1933-prohibition-
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number of states refusing to cooperate with federal marijuana laws increases, the 
federal government’s already limited resources would be stretched even 
thinner.276 Thus, AB 1578 might have encouraged other states to enact similar 
anti-cooperation laws, which would have lead to diminishing effectiveness of any 
attempted federal intervention.277 Further, AB 1578 might have signaled the 
beginning of the end for prohibition of marijuana, but it would have depended on 
how many states enacted similar bills278 and how many resources the federal 
government expended to enforce those laws.279 
4. Would AB 1578 Have Resulted in Federal Intervention for Violating the 
Cole Memo? 
The Cole Memo, issued by Deputy Attorney James Cole, is another Obama-
administration policy that is still in place.280 The 2013 Cole Memo directed 
federal authorities not to target individuals in states that had adopted strong and 
effective regulatory and enforcement systems to control marijuana.281 This 
relaxed standard however was contingent upon “open communication between 
the state and federal government to assure that the state is in compliance with the 
federal priorities.”282 Since AB 1578 would have prevented state or local 
authorities from communicating with federal officials without a court order, 
opponents predicted that it would bring California into direct violation of the 
Cole Memo.283 
If California’s policies were deemed to violate the Cole Memo, the federal 
government might have been forced to intervene.284 Numerous other groups who 
were weary of antagonizing the Trump administration echoed this fear.285 For 
example, if federal authorities discovered that marijuana from California was 
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being illegally sold in another state, they would be prevented from receiving 
assistance or information from state or local authorities without a court order 
signed by a judge.286 In theory, this could have brought California in direct 
violation of the Cole Memo, sparking the kind of federal intervention that AB 
1578 was meant to prevent in the first place.287 However, as noted previously, 
federal intervention without the aid of state or local authorities would be a nearly 
impossible task for the federal government.288 Thus, AB 1578 might have 
violated the Cole Memo and encouraged the federal government to intervene, but 
given the unlikelihood of an effective intervention, the possibility may have been 
a risk worth taking.289  
V. CONCLUSION 
AB 1578 would have protected state-law-abiding individuals involved in 
California’s marijuana industry from federal intervention by ensuring that 
protections provided by the Obama-era policies remained in effect.290 As long as 
the federal government did not intervene, the will of California’s voters would 
continue to control,291 and the state would remain on track to reach $7.6 billion in 
direct sales to consumers by the year 2020.292 In addition, marijuana related 
investments would continue to grow, which in turn, would have helped to expand 
the marijuana job market and its tax revenue.293 Finally, the trend of decreasing 
deaths from opioid overdoses would have continued.294 
While some of AB 1578’s effects on public safety were still too uncertain to 
make any definite predictions, it was not too speculative to suggest that the 
continued operation of the marijuana industry would not have increased violent 
crime rates.295 AB 1578 might have encouraged other states to enact similar anti-
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cooperation bills,296 and might have encouraged a federal intervention for 
violating the 2013 Cole Memo.297 But, even if the intervention were limited to 
California, it would have been difficult for the federal government to do so 
effectively.298 Further, the effectiveness would have been further diminished if 
more states enacted similar laws.299 California has been a leader in the legal 
marijuana movement since passing Proposition 215,300 and if it was successful in 
implementing AB 1578, other states might have mustered the courage to do so as 
well.301 Ultimately, President Trump will decide how the federal government will 
handle enforcement of marijuana laws over the coming years, but AB 1578 
would have forced him to rely solely on federal resources, which might have 
made it practically impossible to enforce federal marijuana laws effectively if he 
decided to intervene.302 
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